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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Mr. Woodley's Claims as Untimely Because 
He Presented an Issue of Fact as to Whether His Mental State Prevented Him From 
Timely Filing a Post-Conviction Petition 
The district court erred in failing to address Mr. Woodley's claim that the time to file his 
post conviction petition should be equitably tolled as a result of his mental incapacity. Because 
Mr. Woodley presented an issue of fact as to whether his mental illness and medications 
prevented him from timely filing the post-conviction action, the district court's e1TOr requires that 
this matter be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 
The state acknowledges that Mr. Woodley presented evidence that he suffered from 
depression for several years and that the depression has been sufficiently severe to lead to suicide 
attempts and hospitalizations. Respondent's Brief, p. 10. The state further admits it can be 
inferred that Mr. Woodley was "incapable of acting on his post-conviction rights at or near the 
times of his hospitalizations." Id. The state nonetheless claims that the district court's dismissal 
of Mr. Woodley's petition as untimely should be affirmed because this evidence does not show 
he was "incapacitated for the entire 16 months between the remittitur and the filing of the 
petition." Id. 
However, Mr. Woodley was not required to show that he was incapacitated for the entire 
sixteen months between the issuance of the remittitur on his direct appeal and the filing of the 
post-conviction petition. Further, it can be inferred from the evidence presented that Mr. 
Woodley was sufficiently incapacitated for the applicable time frame and, thus, his petition 
should not have been dismissed as untimely. 
1. Pertinent period of incapacity 
A sufficiently incapacitating mental illness can equitably toll the statute of limitations for 
post-conviction proceedings. Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 960, 88 P.3d 776, 779 (Ct App. 
2003). '"Tolling' refers to suspending or stopping the running of a statute oflimitations; it is 
analogous to a clock stopping, then restarting." Hooper v. Ebenezer Sr. Services and 
Rehabilitation Center, 687 S.E.2d 29, 32 (S.C. 2009), citing 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of 
Actions§ 169 (2000). 
Thus, Mr. Woodley defeated summary dismissal of his petition by establishing a factual 
issue as to whether incapacity arising from depression or the side effects of his medication 
stopped the one year clock from running for at least four months. In urging that Mr. Woodley 
was required to demonstrate sixteen months of incapacity, the state relies on an excerpt from 
Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383,256 P.3d 791 (Ct. App. 2011) in which the Court of Appeals 
discussed our Supreme Court's application of the discovery exception in Evensiosky v. State, 136 
Idaho 189, 30 P .3d 967 (2001 ). In Evensiosky, the petitioner had discovered the facts giving rise 
to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the expiration of the statute oflimitation. 
The Court held that because the petitioner had sufficient time thereafter to file a petition, there 
was no basis to apply a discovery exception. Evensiosky, 136 Idaho at 191, 30 P.3d at 969. 
Neither Schultz nor Evensiosky discussed equitable tolling based on mental illness. Instead, in 
Schultz, the Court concluded that equitable tolling did not apply because the petitioner did not 
diligently pursue his post-conviction rights. 
The legislature determined that persons should have one year from the time a conviction 
becomes final to prepare a post-conviction petition a length of time that contemplates that such 
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petitions are not counseled, investigated and drafted overnight. When incapacity renders a 
petitioner incapable of pursing post-conviction rights for part of the limitation period, the 
limitation period stops, or is tolled, until capacity is regained. Therefore, Mr. Woodley was not 
required to show incapacity for the entire sixteen months the issuance of the remittitur on his 
direct appeal and the filing of the post-conviction petition. 
2: Sufficient incapacity can be reasonably inferred from the record 
Courts must liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the 
non-moving party-here, Mr. Woodley. See Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277, 
1281 (2010). As acknowledged by the state, the record demonstrates that Mr. Woodley was 
hospitalized on more than one occasion and it is reasonable to infer that Mr. Woodley was 
sufficiently ill during his hospitalizations and that he was incapable of acting on his post-
conviction rights. It is further reasonable to infer that Mr. Woodley's severe depression and 
treatment prevented him from exercising his post-conviction rights following his 
hospitalizations. 
Mr. Woodley was hospitalized for suicidal ideation and self-mutilation the same month 
the remittitur was issued - November 2007 - and was again hospitalized at the Idaho Maximum 
Security Institute on April 23, 2008, after suffering from a breakdown during the period of 
retainedjurisdiction. R. (38195) 36, 41, 43; State's Exhibit A (38348). In May 2008, the prison 
staff opined that Mr. Woodley's cognitive distortions and difficulty grasping and applying 
concepts warranted a second rider. R. (3 8195) 41-43. It is reasonable to infer from this record 
that Mr. Woodley's depression incapacitated him not only during his hospitalizations but, also, 
throughout the periods in between and following. 
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Because post-conviction actions are tried to the judge rather than a jury, the judge in a 
post-conviction action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the 
motion for summary disposition and can arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from 
uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. 
App. 2008). Here, however, the district court made no such findings because it refused to toll the 
statute of limitations on an incorrect theory and this Court must construe all reasonable 
inferences in Mr. Woodley's favor. When the reasonable inferences are drawn in Mr. Woodley's 
favor, he has established an issue of fact as to whether his mental status was sufficiently 
incapacitating to toll the statute of limitations. 
The state incorrectly asserts that the record demonstrates that Mr. Woodley "was not 
prescribed psychotropic medication, but an antidepressant." Respondent's Brief, p. 9. It is 
possible that the state is mistakenly equating psychotropic medication with anti-psychotics. 
However, the term psychotropic medication includes a wide variety of medications used to treat 
an array of mental illnesses and disorders and include antidepressants, anti-psychotics, mood 
stabilizers, anti-obsessive agents, anti-anxiety agents and anti-panic agents and stimulants. See 
i.e. National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) table of Commonly Prescribed Psychotropic 
Medications, available online at http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=Policymakers 
_ Toolkit& Template=/ContentManagement/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=l 8971. 
The district court erred in denying Mr. Woodley's motion for equitable tolling on the 
basis that counsel was appointed to represent him in the underlying criminal proceedings during 
the relevant time period. Additionally, Mr. Woodley presented an issue of fact as to whether 
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mental illness and psychotropic medication prevented him from timely filing a post-conviction 
action. This Court should therefore reverse the district court's order denying equitable tolling 
and remand the case for further proceedings. 
B. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Woodley's Claims as 
Untimely Because Counsel Had an Obligation to Advise Him That the Issues Raised 
in His Pro Se Motions Would Be Properly Raised in a Post-Conviction Petition and 
the State's Conduct Was Misleading 
Mr. Woodley diligently pursued his ineffective assistance of counsel claims within the 
statute of limitations but incorrectly did so by filing his pro se motions instead of a document 
titled petition for post-conviction relief. Counsel appointed to represent Mr. Woodley in the 
criminal case actively assisted Mr. Woodley in pursuing his claims through the incorrect vehicle 
and, thus, counsel had an obligation to advise Mr. Woodley of his post-conviction rights. The 
state further misled Mr. Woodley by misinforming him regarding the statute oflimitations. 
These circumstances deprived Mr. Woodley of a meaningful opportunity to pursue his post-
conviction claims and the case should be remanded for further proceedings on the dismissed 
claims. 
The state's only response to this argument is its incorrect assertion that the issue was not 
raised below. Respondent's Brief, p. 11-12. To the contrary, Mr. Woodley raised counsel's 
ineffective assistance in failing to timely file a post-conviction petition in response to the district 
court's finding that Mr. Woodley was not entitled to equitable tolling because he "was 
represented by able counsel who were charged with representing [his] legal interests" during the 
relevanttimeframe. R.(38195) 110, 132-136, 144. 
Mr. Woodley argued "when the Court denied equitable tolling of the statute oflimitation 
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... it wholly proved" that counsel was ineffective "because counsel failed to file a timely post-
conviction petition." R. (38195) 132. Mr. Woodley then outlined counsel's performance and 
argued that if counsel had done "his homework he would have discovered that the Court's breach 
could have only been brought through post-conviction petition." Id. at 134. However, counsel 
"did not amend complaint to post-conviction relief, nor did he file a petition for post-conviction 
relief." Id. at 13 5. Counsel "remained attorney of record before and after the expiration of the 
statute of limitation on post-conviction relief." Id. at 135. "Counsel had sufficient time and 
evidence to prepare a successful post-conviction petition, however, he did not." Id. at 136. 
"Ultimately, had counsel filed a timely post-conviction petition, [Mr. Woodley] would have been 
entitled to withdraw his plea and the outcome of this case would be different." Id. 
In his third amended petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Woodley alleged that if he 
had received effective assistance of counsel, his petition for post-conviction relief would have 
been timely filed and the state would not be claiming the petition was untimely. R. (3 8195) 186. 
In response, the state argued that the attorney appointed in the criminal case was not appointed to 
represent him in post-conviction. Tr. p. 90, In. 4 - p. 91, ln. 2. Mr. Woodley replied that counsel 
was required to investigate and take a look at "post-conviction procedures and the rights thereof." 
Id. at p. 97, In. 4-21. 1 Mr. Woodley also argued, as he did in his Appellant's Brief in this appeal, 
that he was misled by the state's argument against his motion to withdraw his guilty plea that the 
statute oflimitation to file a post-conviction petition had already expired. Tr. p. 98, In. 1-14; 
Appellant's Brief, p. 10-11. In its order granting the state's motion for summary dismissal in 
1 Mr. Woodley personally made these arguments on his behalf with the leave of the Court 
and counsel. Tr. p. 96, In. 6-15. 
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part, the district court concluded that Mr. Woodley did not timely raise his allegation that counsel 
failed to timely file a post-conviction petition regarding the district court's breach of the Plea 
Agreement. Id. at 209. 
Accordingly, Mr. Woodley argued to the district court that his post-conviction petition 
was not timely filed as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court erred in 
dismissing this claim as untimely rather than recognizing that counsel's ineffective assistance 
and the state's misleading conduct gave rise to exceptional circumstances excusing the statute of 
limitations. This case should therefore be remanded for further proceedings on the dismissed 
claims. 
C. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Woodley's Claims as 
Untimely Because the Pro Se Motions Tolled the Time to File a Motion For Post-
Conviction Relief 
Mr. Woodley timely raised his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in pleadings 
that were mislabeled as "motions" instead of as a "petition" for post-conviction relief. The 
failure to liberally construe Mr. Woodley's prose motions as initiating a post-conviction action 
or as tolling the time to initiate such an action deprives Mr. Woodley of a meaningful opportunity 
to present his claims in violation of the procedural due process guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
In response to this argument, the state claims the issue was not raised below and has been 
resolved by State v. Woodley, Docket No. 38348 (Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2011). Respondent's Brief, 
p. 11-12. However, at the hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal, Mr. Woodley 
argued: 
Now the motion to withdraw a plea may have been titled improperly. If it, if it 
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would have been construed liberally by right, it could have been construed as a 
post-conviction procedures motion. It could have been amended to that. It should 
have been amended to that. The Court should have, should have looked at it, 
construed it liberally. That's my argument 
Tr. p. 99, ln. 25 - p. 100, ln.7. Mr. Woodley thus argued that his prose motions should toll the 
statute of limitations to the district court. 
The state is correct in noting that the Court of Appeals refused to consider Mr. Woodley's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea as a post-conviction petition in the recent appeal from the 
district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.2 The Court of Appeals was 
required to reach such holding in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in State v. Jakoski, 
139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003), which specifically refused to construe a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea as initiating a post-conviction action. However, as argued in Mr. 
Woodley's Opening Brief in this case, the rule in Jakoski is fundamentally unfair and deprives 
pro se inmates of a meaningful opportunity to present their post-conviction claims. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 11-13. 
Accordingly, Jakoski should be overruled and Mr. Woodley's prose motions should be 
liberally construed as initiating a post-conviction action or as tolling the time to initiate such an 
action. The failure to do so would deprive Mr. Woodley of a meaningful opportunity to present 
his claims and would therefore violate the procedural due process guarantee of the Fourteenth 
2 The appeal from the district court's denial of the motion to withdraw plea was permitted 
as post-conviction relief on Mr. Woodley's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file 
an appeal from that denial - the only claim that the district court allowed to proceed as timely. R. 
248-49. The district court mistakenly believed that the claim "encompassed all of the previous 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims." R. 208. However, as evidenced by the Court of 
Appeals' holding in that appeal, the ineffective assistance of counsel claims could not be reached 
as a result of the jurisdictional issues implicated by Jakoski 's holding. 
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Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in his Opening Brief, Mr. Woodley respectfully asks 
this Court to reverse the district court's order summarily dismissing in part his petition for post-
conviction relief and to remand this case to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on 
the dismissed claims. 
Respectfully submitted this ff day of December, 2011. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Robyn yffe 
Attorney for Alexander Jason Woodley 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /j_ day of December, 2011, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Criminal Division, Office 
of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-001 . 
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